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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the role that culture plays in emotional
intelligence, in people's ability to use emotions adaptively in their daily lives.
Specifically, it presented existing cross-cultural research literature on emotional
intelligence, with particular focus on the emotional competencies of Americans and
Indians. The literature on cross-cultural psychology of emotions revealed cross-cultural
similarities as well as differences in each phase of the emotion process. It supported the
view that considerable universality existed with regards to perception of emotions in
facial expressions, while the major sources of differences were detected in the processes
of regulation of emotion and in certain appraisal propensities. Implications of these
cultural variations were discussed with regards to the role of emotional intelligence in the
diagnosis and treatment of psychopathology.
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The Cultural Dimension of Emotional Intelligence and its Clinical Implications
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role that culture plays in emotional
intelligence, in people's ability to use emotions adaptively in their daily lives.
Specifically, it will present the existing research literature on people's capacity to
perceive and identify emotions in others and in themselves, to incorporate emotions into
their thinking, to understand the role and value of emotions in their lives, and to manage
their emotions and use them for their personal development. Particular focus will be
made on research literature that has examined the emotional competencies of Americans
and Indians. The thesis will then discuss the implications of these cultural variations in
the diagnosis and treatment of psychopathology in American and Indian cultures.
Emotional Intelligence Competencies

In this section, I will present existing literature that describes the origins and
evolution of the concept of emotional intelligence (EI). Further, I will look at the specific
competencies that underlie the broader construct of EI and how they are measured
Emotion is one of the most central and pervasive aspects of human experience.
Most people experience a wide range of emotions in their daily lives, from the quiet
satisfaction of completing a relatively mundane task to the overpowering grief at the
death of a near one (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). Emotions also have many facets.
They involve feelings and experience, they involve physiology and behavior, and they
involve conceptualizations and cognitions (Ortony, et al.).
Historically, emotion has often been delegated to the back seat, for emotion has
been considered as an inferior component of human nature (Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler,
& Mayer, 2000; Mayer, 2002). In his description of the historical basis of the philosophy
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of emotions, Solomon (2000) describes how ancient Greek and Stoic philosophers
considered the wisdom of reason to hold the reins while emotion consisted of dangerous
impulses that needed to be suppressed or safely channeled to exist in harmony with
reason. The Greek philosopher Aristotle, in his book The Rhetoric, defined emotions
thus: "Let the emotions be all those things on account of which people change and differ
with regard to their judgments, and upon which attend pain and pleasure, for example
anger, pity, and fear, and all other such things and their opposites" (Aristotle, trans.
1954). Thus, emotions commonly conveyed the idea of irrational passions that had the
power to sway judgment (Planalp & Fitness, 1999).
Emotions: Physiological and Cognitive Components
Scientific theory and research during most of the twentieth century continued to
ignore emotions (Manstead, Frijda, & Fisher, 2004). This situation changed dramatically
in the latter part of the century when there grew an enormous interest in emotion research
within a multitude of disciplines including psychology, biology, sociology, anthropology,
philosophy, neuroscience and cognitive science. New insights followed research, and a
wide range of research gave rise to multiple theories and conceptualizations. Emotions
have been examined and defined in terms of their disruptive/motivational intraorganismic
functions by some psychologists, in terms of interpersonal and institutional functions by
sociologists, and in terms of societal functions and cultural differences by anthropologists
(Ekman & Scherer, 1984). Biological views have focused on the autonomic, central
nervous and neuro-endocrine substrates of emotion, and have defined emotions and
emotional experiences as the result of myriad physiological mechanisms and processes.
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Appraisal and arousal theories ofemotion. Earlier cognitive approaches focused
mainly on the notion that emotion consists of arousal and appraisal (Ortony et aI., 1988).
Proponents of the arousal theory (e.g., Schachter, 1964) believed that in any emotion
there is diffuse sympathetic discharge or autonomic arousal, and the individual's
perceptions of the situation in which the arousal occurred determines how the emotion
comes to be identified in the future. Schachter and Singer (1962) gave an experimental
group an injection of epinephrine and the control group a saline placebo (on pretense of
testing vitamins). Epinephrine mimics autonomic arousal in that it increases heart rate,
respiration and systolic blood pressure. Of the group that had been administered
epinephrine, some were informed of the true side effects while the others were left
uninformed. They were then taken to a room where a confederate involved them in a
series of playful activities. Those who had been given the epinephrine (and who hence
felt aroused) but were unaware of the possible side-effects were significantly more
euphoric than the placebo and informed groups. They felt that their arousal was due to
their involvement in joyful activities. However, researchers like Lazarus (1970) did not
concur with the view that all emotions produce the same kind of physiological response,
thus proposing a second general cognitive approach. He contended that arousal is
contingent on appraisal or how one interprets a stressful situation. For instance, fear is an
emotional reaction that is the result of an appraisal of a threat, while anger is often the
result of an appraisal of infringement. Thus, while researchers like Lazarus recognized
the importance of cognitive processes in emotion, they believed that emotions depended
on appraisals of situations and that arousal followed (Strongman, 1973).
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The cognitive approach of appraisal offers a tantalizing view into the causal
mechanisms involved in emotions. Indeed, what emerges at the core of all these theories
is the awareness that all emotions presuppose certain sorts of cognitions. Irrespective of
what neurobiologists say about the physiology of emotions or behaviorist views about
expressions and bodily actions involved in emotions, there is a growing recognition of the
fact that if a person is demonstrably ignorant of a certain state of affairs or facts, he or she
cannot have certain emotions (Solomon, 2000).
Processing theory ofemotion. It is essential to point out that to claim emotions

always involve some degree of cognition is not the same as asserting that the contribution
of cognition is always necessarily conscious (Ortony et aI., 1988). In fact, the cognitive
approach has found some degree of opposition from views that suggest that an emotional
response can be aroused automatically. Some researchers have demonstrated that
elementary stimuli or fragmentary information, below the level of cognitive awareness
can suffice to elicit some basic emotional reactions (Manstead et aI., 2004).
A dominant approach to making sense of these two seemingly paradoxical
approaches is to look at how our experience of the world is shaped through 'emotional
structures' (Planalp & Fitness, 1999). Emotional structures, referred to as 'first-order
knowledge', are the schematic memories of emotional episodes that are automatically
reactivated when similar situations are encountered, resulting in the production of a
feeling (Levy, 1984). These schemata or tacit emotional understanding of the world
operate outside the realm of our conscious cognition and are often experienced as 'gut
level' feelings about stimuli and people (Planalp & Fitness, 1999). For instance, a child
with only one nurturing caregiver is more likely to experience initial episodes of
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temporary separations from the caregiver as a dangerous loss, as compared to another
child who was cared for by a number of nurturing people. The first child is likely to
develop a schema about losses of loved ones in life, and will unconsciously react to them
more vigorously and negatively than the second child. On the other hand, second-order
knowledge refers to our abstract understandings of various emotions and how they work.
According to anthropologist R. I. Levy (1984), the first-order knowledge leads to
an appraisal, which in turn mobilizes the 'second-order knowledge.' This second-order
knowledge about emotions is available to conscious awareness. It refers to a culturally
influenced system consisting of evaluation of functions of emotions, their relationship to
values and how to deal with these emotions. Based on his anthropological studies of the
nature and function of emotions in a small Tahitian village, Levy gives an example of
second-order knowledge by drawing on the same concept of loss. According to him, a
Tahitian who experiences the loss of something he cared for 'knows' that he has
undergone a loss as a result of his initial appraisal or first-order knowledge of emotions.
However, in accordance with the cultural schemata that shape his second-order
knowledge, such a loss is often experienced as an illness or the harmful effects of a spirit.
Thus in the above example, a child with an ingrained emotional schema about loss is
subjected to various elements in his cultural and environmental milieu (for instance,
caregivers, teachers, peers, etc.) that will shape his emotional experience of loss in the
future.
Other researchers (Leventhal, 1984) have envisioned first-order knowledge as
similar to schematic processing and second-order knowledge as a form of conceptual
processing. Again, schematic processing is rapid and automatic, and does not involve
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reasoning. These emotional schemata are considered to be tightly integrated structures
consisting of eliciting situations, subjective feelings, and expressive and autonomic
feelings (Leventhal). Repeated exposures to specific types of emotionally-provocative
situations become blended into an average prototypic experience. For instance, repeated
exposure to loving encounters with a parent will develop into an emotional schema
wherein the smiling face of a parent evokes a perceptual memory of positive feeling and
its associated facial expression and autonomic feeling. On the other hand, conceptual
processing is voluntary and effortful, wherein an individual consciously reviews and
reflects upon the various aspects of his or her emotional experience and develops
conceptual memory structures about the emotional episode. These structures are drawn
upon to be used in later emotional situations and reactions and playa crucial role in the
formation of conceptual codes for the performance and control of emotional reactions.
Thus, conceptual processing or second-order knowledge of emotions tells us where to
look, how to act, which objects to approach and which people to engage in emotionally
provocative situations.
Emotional Intelligence: How Competent We Are in Processing and Using Emotions
Adaptively
According to Planalp & Fitness (1999, p. 741), simply "acquiring and
strategically using emotion knowledge is one thing; using such knowledge adaptively and
wisely - particularly within the context of personal relationships- is another." Other
psychologists have proposed that understanding our emotions and those of others is the
key to a satisfying life, with those who are self-aware and sensitive managing their lives
gracefully and well even under adverse conditions, while the "emotionally illiterate" find
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their lives full of misunderstandings, frustrations and failed relationships (Matthews,
Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). Individuals are more likely to find happiness and fulfillment
in their lives if they have better awareness and control of not only their own emotions,
but also of others. Organizations and even society in general are more likely Jo benefit
from individuals who perceive emotions in selves and others and use them as signals in
self-understanding and management of others. This growing cognizance of the role of
emotional processes in intelligent behavior has fuelled the growth of the domain that is
now commonly referred to as 'emotional intelligence' (EI).
The origins ofemotional intelligence. The notion of emotional intelligence stems
from the generally prevalent idea that there are different types of intelligence. One type
of intelligence is social intelligence, which E.L. Thorndike originally distinguished from
the other forms of intelligence by defining it as "the ability to understand men and
women, boys and girls - to act wisely in human relations" (1920, p. 228). In essence,
Thorndike defined social intelligence as the ability to perceive one's own and others'
internal states, motives, and behaviors, and to act towards them optimally on the basis of
that information (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Then Howard Gardner (1983) introduced the
idea of multiple intelligences which included both interpersonal intelligence (the capacity
to understand the intentions, motivations and desires of other people) and intrapersonal
intelligence (the capacity to understand one's feelings, fears and motivations).
The first published use of the term emotional intelligence is attributed to Peter
Salovey and John Mayer (1990). Referring to emotional intelligence as a subset of
Thorndike's social intelligence and Gardner's personal intelligences, they defined it as
"the ability to monitor one's own and others' feelings and emotions, to discriminate
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among them, and to use this information to guide one's thinking and action"(p. 189).
However, what catapulted the meteoric rise of the concept in the public mind was the
international best-seller, "Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More than IQ"
(1995) authored by Daniel Goleman (Daus, 2006), a psychologist and former New York
Times reporter. Propounding EI as an intelligence that anyone can have, and in equal
measure, Goleman (1995, p. 34) defined it as "abilities such as being able to motivate
oneself and persist in the face of frustrations; to control impulse and delay gratification;
to regulate one's moods and keep distress from swamping the ability to think; to
empathize and to hope."
Current definitions ofemotional intelligence. Since its rapid rise to fame, there

have been many definitions of emotional intelligence and many claims made about it. In
fact, Salovey and Mayer themselves revised their definition on the grounds that they
found their earlier definition to be impoverished in that it omitted any reference to
thinking about feelings. Their new and current definition is as follows:
Emotional intelligence involves the ability to perceive accurately,
appraise, and express emotion; the ability to access and/or generate
feelings when they facilitate thought; the ability to understand emotion
and emotional knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions to promote
emotional and intellectual growth (Mayer & Salovey, 1997, p. 10).
The field of emotional intelligence is dominated by a multitude of arguments
about the concept, terminology, and operationalization. Emotional intelligence is either
thought of as a set of abilities, a set of traits or a mixed set of both abilities and traits.
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Emotional Intelligence as a Set ofAbilities
The proponents of 'ability EI' have visualized the construct as a form of
intelligence and "intelligence is classically defined as a group of mental abilities that rise
and fall more or less together" (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000, p. 329). Further, they
believe that ability testing is the gold standard in intelligence research, because
intelligence corresponds to the actual capacity to perform well at mental tasks, and not
just one's beliefs about those capabilities.
The primary model. The primary model for 'ability' or performance-based EI is
the hierarchical four-branch model proposed by Mayer and Salovey (1997). Within this
framework, EI is defined as a set of information-processing abilities or skills that are
further classified into four branches of the model. Skills in the lower branches like
perceiving and expressing emotions are essential precursors for the higher, more
integrated processes like the conscious regulation of emotions (Mayer & Salovey).
Competencies included in the model. Branch 1 of the model, 'Perception,
Appraisal and Expression of Emotion' refers to the accuracy with which individuals can
perceive emotions and emotional c<;mtent. A mature individual can correctly identify and
monitor his internal feelings. For instance, if an adult who is staying up late is asked how
she is feeling, she might respond that she is partly tired, partly still full of energy, and
anxious about whether or not her thinking is still clear. Additionally this recognition of
one's internal feelings can be imaginatively generalized from oneself to others, with the
implication that an emotionally mature individual is able to perceive and evaluate
emotion wherever it is expressed, be it in themselves, other individuals, or in artwork. For
instance, an individual who recognizes the connection between his own constricted

Emotional Intelligence 15
posture and himself undergoing stress might be able to recognize anxious expressions in
other individuals, animals and even objects by observing their constricted postures.
Along with the identification and perception of emotions, Branch I also includes the
ability to express emotions through various communication channels like facial
expressions or voices (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000; Mayer & Salovey, 1997).
Branch 2, 'Emotional Facilitation of Thinking' , refers to the ability to use
emotions and emotional events in intellectual processing. It recognizes the functionality
of emotions, the role that emotions play in shaping and improving thinking by directing a
person's attention to important changes. Branch 2 also includes the ability to 'generate
emotion on demand'. For instance, when asked "How does the character in a story feel"
or "How does this other person feel in this situation," an individual may generate the
feelings within himself so as to put himself in the other's place. Such an individual can
anticipate how entering a new school, taking a new job, or encountering a social criticism
might feel. Being able to anticipate such feelings helps a person decide on a future course
of action or planning ahead (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000; Mayer & Salovey, 1997).
Branch 3 of the model, 'Understanding and Analyzing Emotions', incorporates
the ability to understand emotions. Beginning from childhood, an individual learns to
understand the differences and similarities between different emotions, how emotions are
linked to situations (for instance, the relation between loss and sadness when a child's
best friend stops playing with her), and how the same circumstance can provoke
complex, contradictory emotions, e.g. a child learns that it is possible to both love and
hate the same person (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Another central component of this
branch is the ability to reason about the progression of feelings in interpersonal
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relationships (Mayer & Salovey). It involves the understanding that emotions tend to
occur in patterned chains. For instance, a person's anger may intensify to rage, be
expressed and then transform to satisfaction or guilt, depending on the circumstances.
Management of Emotions is the highest branch of the model (Mayer, Caruso, &
Salovey, 2000; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). This involves the conscious regulation of
emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth. Emotional regulation enables an
individual to be open to his feelings, both pleasant and unpleasant, and learn how to
engage and disengage from emotions when appropriate. For instance, rage against an
injustice may be ajustified response. However, an emotionally mature person learns to
draw back from a situation when the rage is at its peak and discuss it with more cool
headed confidants. But later on, the individual might draw on that same emotion to elicit
others' anger in opposition to the said injustice, thus facilitating appropriate action.
Additionally, an individual is able to progress beyond mere feeling of an emotion to the
stage where he consciously reflects on his emotional responses (referred to as meta
evaluation), and effectively regulates them (meta-regulation).

TIlUS

the meta-evaluation

of mood involves how much attention one pays to one's mood, and how typical, clear,
acceptable or influential one's mood is. The meta-regulation part then is about regulating
the mood, either by enhancing the pleasant emotions, dampening or avoiding
exaggeration of the negative ones or simply leaving things alone (Mayer & Salovey). The
internal regulation of one's own emotional state, and the manipulation of the environment
to regulate one's own, and other people's emotions, depends extensively on the skills of
the other branches, i.e. the accurate perception, expression, generation, and understanding
of emotions (MacCann, Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2004).
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Measuring the competencies. Mayer, Salovey and Caruso's measure of emotional
intelligence utilizes comprehensive aptitude-type tests that assess the skills outlined in
their model ofEI (Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer, 2000). The latest version of their
measure is the MSCEIT (Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test- Version 2)
and features performance-based tasks. For instance, the tasks designed to assess
Perception of Emotion (Branch I) require participants to view photographs of faces and
to identify the emotions in them. An example of a Branch 2 (Use of Emotion to Facilitate
Thought) task would be to ask a participant to imagine what mood might be helpful when
generating a large number of new ideas in a group? They are then given a list of five
moods (e.g., sadness, surprise, jealousy, etc.) and are asked to indicate how useful each of
these moods is likely to be on a five-point scale. The third branch (Understanding of
Emotion) is measured by tasks that test a person's ability to analyze complex emotions
and the progression of emotions. An example of a task from this branch might require the
participant to choose the most appropriate response for a statement that says
"Acceptance, joy and warmth often combine to form ...." Finally, the fourth branch
(Management of Emotion) uses tasks like asking participants to decide how effective
different courses of action would be in a short story about another person and his
emotions (Bracket & Salovey, 2004). The authors claim that the scale scores have good
internal consistencies (ranging from .81 to .89), while the correlation coefficient for the
MSCEIT and measures for personality is said to be a low .38 (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso,
2004), the implication being that the MSCEIT is actually measuring something other than
personality.
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Limitations ofthe measure. Although the developers of the MSCEIT have
modeled their measure after traditional ability measures of intelligence, the biggest
problem is that of scoring. Unlike a test of IQ in which there are fixed answers, it is
difficult to come up with one right answer in emotional situations. The developers of the
MSCEIT have attempted to tackle this situation by introducing two forms of scoring,
consensus scoring and expert scoring. The emotional intelligence of a response is
assessed with respect either to the group consensus or to the correct response identified
by experts (a group of21 scholars and researchers on emotion) (Mayer, Salovey &
Caruso, 2004). The rationale for using expert scoring is that psychologists versed in EI
can set the standards. However the solutions to a child's emotional problems can vary,
depending on the viewpoint and expertise of the professional who is providing the
answer. Secondly, it is possible that the views of this pool of experts might reflect a
cultural consensus rather than special expertise (Matthews, et aI., 2002)
The justification for using consensus scoring is the view that the pooled response
of a large normative sample is accurate. While that may be true, the problem here is
discriminating among the most emotionally intelligent people (VanRooy, Visweswaran,
& Pluta, 2005). Critics argue that most people might pick a simple and feasible solution

to an emotionally laden situation, when in reality a different response might be the ideal
one. In such a case, a person with a higher EI might be discriminated against on the test
as his answer would not conform to the consensus response. Additionally, although the
authors of the MSCEIT claim to have used a diverse sample of respondents from around
36 countries, the fact remains that the consensus group consisted of 57.9% whites, with
1240 participants from the United States and only 194 from India (Mayer, Salovey,
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Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003). This obviously raises concerns about the validity of
consensus judgments that cross cultural boundaries (Matthews et aI., 2002).
Critics of the ability measures also argue that measures like the MSCEIT test
knowledge of emotions but not necessarily the ability to perform tasks that are related to
the knowledge that is assessed. For instance, a person may know the correct answer to a
question about the appropriate response to the grief of a bereaved person, but that does
not guarantee that such a person is actually skilled in performing the task of comforting a
bereaved person (Brody, 2004).
Emotional Processing Competency as a Set ofTraits
The concept of 'trait EI' was propounded by Petrides & Furnham (2001) who
believe that a theoretical construct should be named according to what it measures.
Petrides and Furnham (2000, 2001) suggest that while performance based measures
assess "ability Ef', self-report methods or informant reports commonly measure what
they refer to as "trait E1" - behavioral dispositions and self-perceived abilities with
regards to emotional intelligence. Thus, the authors proposed a differentiation between
trait EI and ability EI, wherein the former is measured through self-reports and the latter
through performance measures.
The primary model. Based on their own analysis of the existing peer-research on
EI, Petrides & Furnham (2001) concluded that a lot of the 'traits' that the self-reports
measured (for instance, empathy, assertiveness, optimism on Bar-On's Emotional
Quotient Inventory or EQi, empathy and assertivenss on Goleman's Emotional
Competence Inventory or ECI, and so forth) were basically studied as personality traits,
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thus strengthening their stand that trait EI should primarily be studied under the
personality framework.

The competencies included in the model. According to the 'Trait EI' model, an
emotionally intelligent person is likely to be capable of superior emotion appraisal,
expression, management and regulation, in addition to exhibiting other broader
competencies like adaptibility, assertiveness, self-esteem, trait empathy, etc. It appears
that what these researchers are suggesting is a different approach to study EI altogether,
one that can be studied within the domain of personality. In fact, they have even
suggested an alternative name for their conceptualisation of the construct -'emotional
self-efficacy.' However, they decided to refer to it as 'trait EI' in their work so as to link

it clearly "to the extant literature on EI ...." (Petrides & Furnham, 2001, p. 427).
Measuring the competencies. The Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire
(TEIQue) is a self-report measure that was specifically designed to measure the construct
of trait EI comprehensively and is currently available in 15 languages. The TEIQue
provides an operationalization for Petrides and colleagues' model that conceptualizes EI
in terms of personality and the authors clearly distinguish it from other existing measures
by remarking that" the TEIQue is a scientific measurement instrument based exclusively
on trait EI theory. Trait EI theory is unrelated to what lay people understand by
"emotional intelligence" or "EQ" and incompatible with other models of the construct"
(petrides, 2008, Background section). The test includes 15 subscales organized under
four factors: Well-Being, Self-Control, Emotionality, and Sociability. The sub-scales are:
Adaptability, Assertiveness, Emotion perception (self and others), Emotion expression,
Emotion management (others), Emotion regulation, Impulsiveness (low), Relationships,
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Self-esteem, Self-motivation, Social awareness, Stress management, Trait empathy, Trait
happiness & Trait optimism. Thus, according to this model, an emotionally intelligent
person is one who is adaptable, assertive, low in impulsivity, motivated, socially aware,
empathic, happy and optimistic in addition to being able to perceive and manage
emotions in self and others, express emotions optimally and regulate his or her emotions.
Limitations ofthe measure. As mentioned before, this measure is based on an

entirely different view of our overall competency in emotional processing, one that views
it as a set of personality traits, behavioral dispositions and self-perceived abilities. It
naturally follows that researchers who support the notion that the competency in
emotional processing should be viewed as an intelligence have criticized this approach.
Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2000) are critical of other partly-overlapping definitions of
emotional intelligence as they end up covering almost all of personality.
Emotional Intelligence as a Mixed Set ofAbilities and Traits

Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey (2000) differentiated their 'ability model' from the
other existing definitions of EI by referring to them as 'mixed models' that incorporate
mental abilities in addition to a wide range of personality characteristics (e.g. EQi, ECI,
etc). Thus, mixed models view EI as an inclusive set of traits that predict emotionally
intelligent behavior but are not limited to intelligence or related forms of ability per se
(MacCann et aI., 2004).
The primary models. The theoretical framework underlying the mixed models is

not as clearly demarcated, as there are many competing models (MacCann et aI., 2004).
One of the most well-known models is the one proposed by Reuven Bar-On (2000) who
defines emotional and social intelligences as 'a multifactorial array of emotional,
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personal and social abilities that influence our overall ability to actively and effectively
cope with daily demands and pressures" (p. 385).
The competencies included in the model. Rather than a hierarchical set of abilities,

the Bar-On model has five different dimensions of emotional and social competencies,
namely, the Intrapersonal, Interpersonal, Adaptation, Stress management and General
mood dimensions. These dimensions are composed of a set of lower -order EI facets
(self-regard, emotional self-awareness, assertiveness, stress tolerance, impulse control,
reality testing, flexibility, problem solving, empathy, and interpersonal relationship) as
well as facilitators of these competencies (optimism, self-actualization, happiness,
independence, social responsibility) (Bar-On, 2000). Thus, according to this model, a
highly emotionally intelligent person is one who is emotionally self-aware, has high self
regard and can tolerate stress well, is assertive but flexible, empathic, has good problem
solving skills and successful inter-personally, in addition to being happy, optimistic,
independent and socially responsible.
Bar-On posits that EI develops over time and that it can be improved through
training, programming, and therapy. He hypothesizes that those individuals with higher
than average E.Q.'s are in general more successful in meeting environmental demands
and pressures, while a deficiency in EI can mean a lack of success and the existence of
emotional problems, especially among those individuals with deficits in reality testing,
problem solving, stress tolerance, and impulse control. In general, Bar-On considers
emotional intelligence and cognitive intelligence to contribute equally to a person's
general intelligence, which then offers an indication of one's potential to succeed in life.
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Measuring the competencies. Based on his conceptualization of competency in
emotional processing, Bar-On developed the self-reported EQi (Emotional Quotient
Inventory). It consists of 15 EI subscales that further define five higher-order dimensions,
namely, the Intrapersonal, Interpersonal, Adaptation, Stress management and General
mood dimensions (Bar On, 2000). Although researchers have acknowledged the
thoroughness of Bar-an's research and the use oflarge, diverse samples in the
development of the measure, they have commented on the close relationships between
the EQi and other measures of personality like the Big-Five, and its poor convergence
with the MEISIMSCEIT (Matthews et aI., 2002).

It is interesting that Mayer ,Salovey and their colleagues who are now the
strongest supporters of performance based scales to measure emotional intelligence,
developed one of the earliest self-report measures of EI, based on their initial
conceptualization of the construct. They referred to it as the Trait-Meta-Mood Scale
(TMMS), consisting of 30-items which tap into people's beliefs about their aptitude to
attend to their own mood states (Attention), their understanding of their own and others'
feelings (Clarity) and their ability to engage in mood-repair (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman,
Turvey, & (1995). The items of this measure are straight-forward - for example, "I pay a
lot of attention to how I feel" (Attention), "I can never tell how I feel" (Clarity - reverse
scored), and "I try to think good thoughts no matter how I feel" (Repair). The authors
later contended that the TMMS has its limitations as it only served to examine some of
the emotional competencies that they outlined in their subsequent four-branch
hierarchical model. However, they have continued to make use of it in research as a
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measure of Perceived Emotional Intelligence or Trait EI (Femandez-Berrocal, Salovey,
Vera, Extremera, & Ramos, 2005).
The SREIs or Schutte Self -Reported Emotional Intelligence Scale was developed
by Nicola Schutte (Schutte et aI., 1998). Although the measure is essentially a self-report,
the developers claim that it is based on Salovey-Mayer's original model of emotional
intelligence which consisted of the following three abilities: appraisal and expression of
emotion, regulation of emotion and utilization of emotions in solving problems. The
authors suggest that the scale measures a unitary factor that represents the homogenous
construct of emotional intelligence. Further, they claimed that the scale showed good
discriminant validity as the measure was not significantly related to four of the big five
personality dimensions, other than openness to experience. In sum, the authors refer to it
as a scale that "holds promise as a valid, reliable measure of emotional intelligence as
conceptualized by Salovey and Mayer (p. 176)."
Limitations ofthe measures. Researchers who believe emotional intelligence is
actually a form of ability, including Salovey, Mayer and colleagues, have criticised the
self-reports of EI on the grounds that such measures are open to bias, as people would
naturally want to answer questions in a way that places them in a favorable light Thus,
the view is that self-report measures are often not the actual portrayal of a person's
behavior (Daus, 2006).
Emotional Intelligence: An Ability, A Trait or Both?
An overview of the different measures covered here will give the readers an idea

that, while performance-based measures like the MSCEIT assess abilities like emotion
perception, expression, understanding and regulation, self-report measures also claim to
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measure most of these four areas in addition to certain behavioral dispositions or traits. In
this basic difference in conceptualization lies the area of maximum contention. It is
apparent that Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2004) view EI much like verbal or spatial
intelligence, except that it operates on and with emotional content. There are many others
who concur with this view and they believe that only maximum-performance tests
measure ability EI (Barchard & Hakstian, 2004). The other prominent view is that
emotional intelligence includes a considerable number of personality traits and hence
better accessed through self-reports. Thus, a section of the literature on competency in
emotional processing supports the notion that Ability EI and Trait EI may actually be two
separate constructs that are distinctly related to cognitive abilities and personality
respectively (Van Rooy et aI., 2005).
Recent advances in the work of learning disabilities and education has encouraged
some researchers to revisit their ideas of intelligence (Mayer, 2000). They now believe
that cognitive intelligence should no longer be viewed as a single all-encompassing
ability, but as a conglomeration of many small component processes. These intellectual
skills are domain specific, meaning that competence in a process for one domain (e.g.
planning an essay) does not necessarily imply competence in another domain (planning
solution to a word problem). This view contradicts the implications of a hierarchical
model ofEI as proposed by Mayer and Salovey (1997), wherein proficiency in the lower
branches (emotion appraisal and expression) is a pre-requisite for proficiency in the
higher branches (e.g., emotion regulation). On the other hand, it does support the so
called mixed models which construe emotional ability as a group of competencies that
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are closely related to each other, but do not require some of them to be a pre-requisite for
the others.
Intelligence is generally considered an ability, but most researchers also agree that
intelligence is normally distributed in the population and that there is evidence that
intelligence is genetically influenced. That supports the case that intelligence can be
considered as a trait. However, the problem with conceptualizing emotional intelligence
or any form of intelligence as a trait is that, by character, any trait is said to be stable over
a long duration of time. However, one of the most exciting claims that have been made
about emotional intelligence is that EI can be trained, and thus increased. This claim
about EI would go against the conceptualization of EI as a trait, because researchers
believe that deep, pervasive and lasting changes in personality are not really possible,
though it might be possible to bring out certain superficial changes in attitudes and
behaviors (Costa & Mc Crae, 1986).
Amidst this argument about the actual construct of emotional intelligence, there is
also the recognition that in spite of apparent differences in the different 'models' of EI,
they are not mutually exclusive of each other (Petrides & Furnham, 2001; VanRooy et
aI., 2005). Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso also concur that one way of viewing emotional
intelligence is as a general ability-trait (2000). As mentioned before, their main problem
with the other 'mixed' models is that the other partly-overlapping definitions of
emotional intelligence end up covering almost all of personality. McCrae (2000)
suggested that it would be more prudent to recognize that the processing of emotional
information involves specific abilities as well as certain personality traits rather that
continue to debate about whether EI is a disposition or a trait. It is interesting that this
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idea of viewing emotional intelligence as more of a mixed construct straddling both
worlds of intelligence and personality is slowly finding favor (Lyusin, 2006).
Emotional Intelligence and Well-Being

In this section, I will present existing research findings on the relationship
between emotional intelligence and physical/psychological well-being and
psychopathology. Does knowing how individuals fare on each of the specific EI
competencies allow us to predict their physical health and psychological well-being?
Additionally, how can this knowledge guide us in determining appropriate interventions?
The novelty and popularity of the concept of Emotional Intelligence has triggered
an ongoing spate of research into the relationship between EI and various areas of human
functioning. Considerable research has been devoted to the role of EI in industrial and
organizational psychology and the application of EI in school settings. In recent years,
researchers have attempted to examine how people's ability to use emotions adaptively in
their daily lives might influence their physical and psychological health. Salovey (2006)
suggests that emotional intelligence is central to maintaining good health. He is not alone
in thinking so. Other researchers concur that the perception, use, understanding and
regulation of emotion in an adaptive manner may possible contribute to mental and
physical health in numerous ways (Schutte, Malouff, Thorsteinsson, Bhullar, & Rooke,
2007), and that there is a relationship between higher levels of EI and better physical and
psychological health (Tsaousis & Nikolaou, 2005).
Trait EI has been found to predict happiness in one study of 112 female student
participants in London (Chamorro-Premuzic, Bennett, & Furnham, 2007). In this study,
trait EI (as measured by the TEIQue) was found to be positively correlated with
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happiness (as measured by the Oxford Happiness Inventory), over and above personality
traits like stability, extraversion, conscientiousness, and agreeableness. Other data
suggest that adolescents of both genders who scored higher on their perceived abilities to
understand and repair their emotions showed higher life satisfaction and lower perceived
stress (Fernandez-Berrocal, Alcaide, Extremera, & Pizarro, 2006). In a similar vein,
middle-aged women with higher scores on perceived emotional intelligence were seen to
enjoy higher levels of psychological and social adjustment and fewer physical health
problems (Extremera & Fernandez-Berrocal, 2002). It thus appears that the benefits of
adaptive usage of emotions in daily lives on psychological well-being extend to all age
groups.
Implications for Diagnosing and Establishing Psychopathology
Given that the competencies or skills included under the broad construct of
emotional intelligence refer to adaptive usage of emotions in our daily lives, it is but
natural that considerable research has been devoted to examining the relationship
between EI and different mental disorders in which emotion plays a central role. In fact,
Matthews, et al. (2002) are of the opinion that the implications of emotional intelligence
should not be limited only to disorders where emotional states are a key feature such as
anxiety and mood disorders. They should also extend to those where the emotional state
per se is not prime, but where other qualities related to awareness and management of
emotion might be more directly involved, as in impulse control disorders and personality
disorders. For instance, Matthews, et al. (2002) suggest that low EI has been related to
interpersonal difficulties due to lack of insight into others' feelings and intentions, and
many personality disorders are often associated with difficulties in relating to others.
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Research has substantiated links between EI and some of the disorders mentioned
above. It was found that individuals who score lower on emotional clarity and individuals
who perceive an inability to repair their emotional states as measured by the TMMS are
more likely to report higher scores on measures like the Beck Depression Inventory
(Fernandez-Berrocal et aI., 2005). Interestingly, higher scores for depression were also
reported by individuals who scored higher on the Attention scale of the TMMS which
evaluates how much attention an individual pays to his or her emotions. It might seem
paradoxical that higher scores on what has essentially been touted as a component of
emotional intelligence is correlated to psychopathology like depression. However, it
appears that excessive self -focused attention or increased awareness of internally
generated stimuli like emotions and cognitions is associated with negative affect in both
clinical and non-clinical samples (Mor & Winquist, 2002). This might be because
excessive attention to one's emotions or cognitions might actually lead to rumination.
Rumination is described as passively and repetitively focusing on one's symptoms of
distress and the circumstances surrounding those symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). In
another study, the perceived ability to discriminate between different moods and feelings
(as measured by the Clarity dimension on the TMMS) in a sample of middle-aged women
was found to be positively correlated to their perceptions of physical and social
functioning, mental health and vitality (Extremera & Fernandez-Berrocal, 2002). In the
same study, the sample group's perceived ability to repair their emotional states was
positively correlated to their perceptions of social functioning, mental health, vitality, and
general health, in addition to being negatively correlated with bodily pain. Both these
studies thus demonstrate that excessive attention to one's feelings may be associated with
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negative states like depression, while the ability to understand one's feelings and actively
regulate one's moods are more likely to result in a positive state of being, both physical
as well as psychological.
Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, and Mayer (1999) believe that different components
of emotional intelligence are related to the coping process in response to stress. In an
experiment, Salovey, Mayer, et aI., (1995) examined the relation of individual differences
in beliefs about attention to, clarity, and regulation of feelings (as measured by the
TMMS) to sustained negative affect and intensity and persistence of thought after being
exposed to a distressing stimulus. In this study, 78 student volunteers were asked to see a
film clip containing graphic footage of vehicle accidents and their aftermath. The
subjects' moods were recorded after showing the clip, and they were asked to focus on
and jot down their thoughts every 1-2 minutes for a total of 12 times, following which
their moods were recorded again. It was seen that while overall participants reported
negative moods initially after seeing the film clip, those individuals who reported being
clear about their feelings on the TMMS were more likely to rebound from their initial
mood drop. Additionally, analysis of the thought samples revealed that those individuals
who reported being clear about their feelings showed a reduction in their negative
thoughts over time; however those individuals who were not able to clearly distinguish
their feelings continued to ruminate about the distressing event.
Salovey, Bedell, et al. (1999) used the results of the above experiment to
substantiate their hypothesis that clarity in discriminating feelings was important in the
overall ability to repair one's mood and cope with a stressful event, while rumination
usually hinders it. Additionally, they believe that there are two other skills that an
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emotional intelligent person utilizes during the coping process - social support and
emotional disclosure. They go on to suggest that how an individual chooses to repair
one's mood state following a stressful event will ultimately determine the result of the
coping process. They argue that emotional intelligence will predict which individuals are
more likely to develop a healthy social network and engage in sharing their thoughts and
feelings with friends and family, as well as engage in disclosure processes like personal
writing (e.g., diaries, journals) as a means of successful and healthy coping after exposure
to stressful events in their lives (Salovey, Bedell, et aI., 1999). Other researchers
(Kokkonen, Pulkkinen, & Kinnunen, 2001) have substantiated the claims about the
importance of our perceived ability to repair or regulate our own moods by demonstrating
that individuals' active conscious attempts to tum a negative emotion into a more positive
direction were responsible for lesser self-reported physical symptoms (e.g., pain, fatigue,
gastrointestinal, cardiac and nervous symptoms).
The above studies make it obvious that researchers are increasingly focusing on
the links between individuals' ability to pay attention to and perceive, understand, and
regulate their own moods and their physical and psychological health and well-being.
This is not surprising given that a review of literature will reveal endless references to the
links between deficits in different spheres of emotional competence and sychopathology.
There is reason to believe that depression may be caused by a deficit in the ability to
perceive emotional distress as a negative affect state and not merely a physiological state,
by an inability to understand the cause behind the feeling, and by one or more deficits in
ability to regulate the negative affect state through use of appropriate strategies (Garber,
Braflaadt, & Zeman, 1991). In the light of different competencies that fall under the
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emotional intelligence framework, it is now easy to see how depressed mood or negative
affect might be related to excessive attention to one's emotions and cognitions or
rumination, while more positive affect is related to increased clarity about one's feelings
and the ability to regulate one's feelings using strategies like emotional disclosure or
social sharing.
Similarly, generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) has also been conceptualized as a
disorder with deficit in emotion regulation. One of the theories about GAD is that an
individual who resorts to worry is using it to "trick" himself into believing that he or she
is actually doing something about the situation on hand, instead of skillfully approaching,
avoiding or reevaluating the problem (Rodebaugh & Heimberg, 2008). In other words,
these authors hypothesize that people with GAD use worry to avoid negative affect and
lack the ability to self-regulate their emotions. Very few studies have explicitly examined
the link between EI and anxiety disorders, though there is some evidence to suggest that
adolescents who report better ability to discriminate clearly among feelings and to
regulate their emotional states (as measured by the TMMS) showed less anxiety as
measured by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Fernandez-Berrocal, et aI., 2006).
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is another category of psychopathology
that has been irrefutably linked to emotional dysregulation. BPD is a serious mental
illness characterized by pervasive instability in moods, interpersonal relationships, self
image, and behavior that often disrupts family and work life, long-term planning, and the
individual's sense of self-identity (National Institute of Mental Health, 2001).
"Behavioral patterns in BPD are functionally related to or are unavoidable consequences
of this fundamental dysregulation of several, perhaps all, emotions, including both
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positive and negative emotions" (Linehan, Cochran, & Kehrer, 2001, p. 480). Emotional
dysregulation is considered the core of this pathology. In spite of this understanding
about the disorder, there is little research that examines any direct links between BPD and
emotional intelligence. One study (using lower and upper division psychology students at
a Midwestern university as participants) that was designed to examine whether
personality disorder symptomatology could be associated with emotional intelligence
found that individuals who scored higher on the measure of borderline personality
disorder reported lesser perceived ability to discriminate their own feelings (emotional
Clarity) and lesser perceived ability to regulate their emotions (as measured by the Repair
dimension on the TMMS) (Leible & Snell, 2004). Additionally, those individuals also
reported lower scores on the dispositional tendency to pay attention to, to be concerned
with and to be aware of other people's public reactions to one's private emotional
experiences, as measured by dimensions on another scale (Multidimensional Emotional
Awareness Questionnaire) used in the study. Together, it appears from this study that
individuals with BPD score lower in various emotional competencies, ranging from
deficits in their perceived ability to attend to others' emotions, to understanding and
regulating their own emotions.
As research progresses in these areas, it is expected that the links between various
emotional competencies and how they influence the development and maintenance of
different psychological disorders will become clearer. As some critics have pointed out,
''the idea of pathologically low emotional intelligence would be more useful if EI theory
specified a defined subset of pathological processes that related directly to emotion
regulation, and other pathological processes that do not" (Matthews, et aI., 2002, p. 411).
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According to them, simply demonstrating that low emotional intelligence is positively
correlated to depression or borderline personality disorder is not enough.
Implications for Therapy
It is essential to delineate the specific emotional competencies related with

various psychological disorders for another vital reason. An analysis of how individuals
differ in the various competencies that make up emotional intelligence can provide clues
to effective counseling. Knowing where an individual falls short will give the therapist an
idea about where to intervene. For instance, studies in naturalistic settings have shown
that depressed individuals exhibit diminished expression of positive emotion, while
evincing more frequent displays of negative emotion (Rottenberg & Vaughan, 2008).
This is a finding that can be potentially related to the EI competencies involved in
appraisal, perception and expression of emotions. Corroboration of this hypothesis will
provide a direction to therapists who can collaborate with their clients on recognizing the
role of emotion expression in their daily lives and how they are perceived by others
around them.
Analyses of how emotional competencies are differentially affected in disorders

will assist in tailoring therapeutic interventions in other ways as well. A study conducted
amongst Spanish high school students examined the relation of mood regulation to
symptoms of endogenous depression versus hopelessness depression (Williams,
Femandez-Berrocal, Extremera, Diaz, & Joiner, 2004). Endogenous depression is a
distinctive state of depression which is characterized by a lack of reactivity to the
environment (Klein, 1974). The primary precipitating factor for this type of depression is
linked to somatic or biological factors, and a precipitating life event is less likely to be
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found before the onset of depressive symptoms (Lewinsohn, Zeis, Zeis, & Haller, 1977).
On the other hand, hopelessness depression is defined as a subtype of depression for
which the contributory cause is a negative attributional style combined with a
precipitating negative life event (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). Williams and his
colleagues (2004) found that the correlation between mood regulation skills (as measured
by the Repair dimension on the TMMS) and endogenous depression was significantly
smaller as compared to that between Repair and hopelessness depression. The authors go
on to suggest that patients with clear endogenous symptom profiles are less likely to
benefit from psychotherapeutics focused on mood regulation, as compared to others with
non-endogenous symptom profiles.
Many clinicians might claim that they have already been using knowledge of
different competencies included in the EI framework to guide their work with clients.
That in many ways is true. Some well-established modalities of therapy in the field
already aim to inculcate at least some or most of the skills that are part of the EI
framework. For instance, Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) which is widely used for
individuals suffering from Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) targets the core
emotional dysregulation that characterizes the condition, by teaching the client the skills
needed to tolerate emotional experiences without engaging in extremes of affect or in
behaviors that that worsen the situation (Koerner, 2006). Similarly, proponents of
Cognitive-Behavior Therapy (CBT) claim that the cognitive therapist's work loosely
resembles improving a client's EI (Matthews, et aI., 2002). These authors provide
instances of how CBT might assist a client with social phobia who misperceives
emotions, or when a client falsely appraises others as scornful, when a client with panic
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disorder has a problem in understanding his emotions and mislabels his fear to a somatic
source or when a depressed client shows poor management of emotions by withdrawing
even further from his social support.
Advocates of some other modalities of psychotherapy specifically refer to the
skills or competencies that make for emotional intelligence, and aim to improve them
during the course of therapy with clients. Emotions -Focused Couples Therapy (EFCT) is
one such approach that focuses on the importance of emotional interactions in
relationships. EFCT attempts to bring about positive change by encouraging couples to
pay attention to emotions and emotional expressions and to become more aware of them,
by correcting problems related to either emotional under or over regulation, reflecting on
and gaining a better understanding of the emotional experience and finally transforming
the maladaptive emotional responses (Goldman & Greenberg, 2006).
From this section, we see how the concept of emotional intelligence or the various
competencies that assist in adaptive usage of emotions in our daily lives can be
successfully used to gain a better understanding of what fosters or hinders psychological
health and well-being. While research is still in its initial stages in many of the areas and
mostly only tentative links have been established between the various emotional
competencies and psychopathology, it is clear that there exists enormous potential for
future research that will establish and clarify these links beyond doubt. Doing so will also
provide clinicians with substantial tools to provide more tailored interventions to their
clients who suffer from difficulties in handling emotion in their daily lives.
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Cultural Variations in Emotional Intelligence Competencies
In this section, I will address the question "Does culture playa role in emotional
intelligence?" I will focus on research findings on cultural variations in EI competencies
(specifically between Indians and Americans) as well as on what explains these
differences.
As stated earlier, emotional intelligence has often been equated to other forms of
cognitive intelligence (e.g., verbal or spatial intelligence). Whereas group differences in

I.Q. on the basis of ethnic or cultural background has always been a controversial and
sensitive issue, the role of culture in emotional intelligence still remains to be clearly
established. While the influential role of culture in emotional intelligence has been
readily accepted from the onset by some researchers (Fernandez-Berrocal et aI., 2005;
Poon Teng Fatt & Chew Keng Howe, 2003), it must be mentioned that developers of one
of the prominent EI theories claim that "EI theory is based upon basic emotions theory
that views emotions as generally universal in nature, ..." (Caruso, 2008, p.14).
Regardless of whether emotional intelligence is a form of cognitive ability or a
personality trait, the fact remains that emotional intelligence incorporates the exhibition
of some form of self-efficacy or competence in emotionally-laden situations. And it is
extremely hard, or almost impossible to separate emotional competence from cultural
context (Saarni, 1997). As stated before, a common view is that our experience of the
world is shaped through 'emotional structures' (Planalp & Fitness, 1999). While these
emotional structures or 'first order knowledge' lead to an appraisal and initial emotional
reaction, our 'second-order knowledge' of emotions refers to our abstract understanding
or evaluation ofthe functions of emotions, their relationship to values and how to deal
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with these emotions. This is the part of emotional processing that is more accessible to
consciousness (Levy, 1984) and thus to reflection and discussion. It is also likely to differ
from culture to culture, nested as it is within a cultural framework.
Cross-cultural Studies in Emotional Intelligence
Bhattacharya, Dutta, & MandaI (2004) attempted to study the factor structure of
EI in India, by developing a scale of items drawn from various sources as well as the
Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale or the MEIS (the precursor to the current
perfonnance based measure MSCEIT) and Schutte's EIS. These items were then judged
by a team of experts who selected items based on the construct of Emotional Intelligence
and the suitability of items in cultural context. This scale was then administered to a
group of62 managers who were also administered Schutte's EIS, and the two scales
demonstrated a correlation of .75. The items were then subjected to a factor analysis
which revealed loadings on five main factors, namely appraisal of negative emotions,
appraisal of positive emotions, interpersonal conflict & difficulties, interpersonal skills &
flexibility and emotional facilitation & goal orientedness. The authors felt that in contrast
to the items in Schutte's scale which are mostly self-referential, the newly developed
scale contained items that described EI in reference to the self as well as in interpersonal
context. They conclude that EI in a collectivistic country like India largely depends on
the acceptability of an individual's behavior and emotional expressions in the socio
cultural context. While the authors have made a valid point about the importance of
cultural context, the process of selecting the initial items remains unclear. They have
failed to mention all the different 'sources' from which the items were drawn, and the
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theoretical background on which their construct of EI is based. Thus, it is difficult to give
credence to their findings as the correct picture of EI in the Indian context.
Another study by Pant and Prakash (2004) evaluated the construct of EI in India,
as assessed by the MEIS (the precursor to the MSCEIT). They administered the MEIS to
a sample of 60 participants, including graduate students and executives and compared the
findings to the consensus scores used by Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso in 1999 for
developing the MEIS. The overall mean scores for the individual tasks were similar for
the sample and consensus groups. However, the reliabilities were definitely lower
especially for the Faces task (Indian sample

a = .31; Consensus a = .89) and the

Managing Others (Indian sample a = .40; Consensus a = .72) task. The authors contend
that the low reliability on the Faces task could be attributed to the unfamiliarity of
American facial expressions to the Indian sample. However, this argument goes against
the dominant finding of research on universal emotions, which suggests that basic
emotions are universally recognized. The low reliabilities on the Managing Others task
was attributed by the authors to the fact that the American vignettes were not culturally
relevant to the Indian participants. Thus, this study demonstrated the limitations of using
an ability based measure of EI that contains tasks that are not relevant to the cultural
context of the participants.
Sibia, Misra, and Srivasatava (2004) have argued that EI in the Indian context
cannot be viewed as a homogenous trait or ability devoid of its associated social concerns
or moral values, and that culture-specific ways of behaving are basic to the notion of EI.
In their study that aimed to conceptualize the indigenous notion of EI in the Indian socio

cultural context, 1047 participants, including parents, teachers and students from eight
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different Indian cities described the emotional qualities desired by them in children and
those required to be successful in life. The responses received primarily belonged to four
major categories, namely pro-social values ("respecting elders," "being affectionate"),
social sensitivity ("concern for others," "empathizing with others"& "control of negative
emotions"), action tendencies ("being helpful"& "disciplined") and affective states
("happy disposition"& "optimism"). The authors believe that their findings reveal how
contemporary Indian society interprets EI differently from the Western view "which lays
emphasis on hierarchical acquisition of abilities, which are clearly distinguishable from
traits such as warmth, sociability, etc" (Sibia et aI., p. 121). Once again in this study, the
authors address an extremely vital point about how cultural traditions and moral values
provide a frame for emotional competencies; however the problem encountered here is
akin to what Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2000) felt about trait based definitions ofEI
covering all of personality ultimately.
In spite of the different approaches and hypotheses involved in the
aforementioned studies, they all share one common feature: the recognition of how
desirable emotional qualities in the Indian context reflect concerns, expressions and
behaviors that are intertwined with the participants' relationships with others, rather than
focusing solely on the self. It appears that the concept of emotional intelligence in the
Indian context is not limited to a set of unique abilities that reside within an individual;
instead it is more of a set of abilities and traits that are in tum influenced and modified by
the context of the prevalent cultural ethos of society at large.
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Factors that May Influence Emotional Processing Competence in the Indian Context
Individualism-Collectivism. As the private self in India is more organized around

'we', 'our' and 'us' (Sibia et al., 2004), India has often been referred to as a collectivistic
culture, as opposed to the individualistic cultures of the West. Individualism-Collectivism
was proposed by Hofstede (1991) as one of the dimensions along which countries are
found to differ. Individualists view themselves as independent of any group, are primarily
motivated by their own preferences, needs and rights, while giving preference to their
own goals over those of others (Triandis, 1995). Collectivists on the other hand, value
harmony and group solidarity and are ready to give priority to the goals of others in their
group over their own. As the collectivist self is seen as part of the group, there are
heightened concerns about self-presentation and loss of face (Singh-Manoux &
Finkenauer, 2001).
Another way in which collectivist emotions highlight the interdependent self is
that emotions are felt more intensely if the appraisals reflected that the situation was
relevant to respectability, status, or in group respectability (Mesquita, 2001). Collectivist
cultures are also characterized by a greater impulse to interact with the environment and
change the relationship with the environment under emotional circumstances as
compared to their individualistic counterparts (Mesquita). This could explain why
collectivistic cultures are more open to social sharing or sharing their emotional
experience with their family and friends (Singh-Manoux & Finkenauer, 2001).
Masculinity-Femininity. However, the differences on emotional intelligence

across cultures cannot always be attributed to differences in cultures along the
dimensions ofIndividualism-Collectivism. One such study was carried out by Fernandez
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Berrocal et al. (2005) to examine the influence of cultural factors on the relationship
between perceived EI and depression. Participants from the U.S., Chile and Spain
completed the Trait-Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS) and the Beck Depression Inventory
(BDI). The cultural factors used in this study were Hofstede's dimensions of
Individualism-Collectivism and Masculinity-Femininity, with U.S. being the
individualistic, masculine culture and the other two countries being examples of more
collectivistic, feminine cultures. So called 'masculine' cultures value competitiveness,
assertiveness, ambition, and the accumulation of wealth and material possessions,
whereas 'feminine' cultures place more value on relationships and quality oflife. Results
showed that lower scores on Attention (perceived ability to attend to their own mood
states) and higher scores on Clarity (understanding oftheir own and others' feelings) and
Repair (ability to engage in mood-repair) on the TMMS were linked to lower scores on
the BDI across cultures, as expected. However, contrary to expectations, the dimensions
ofIndividualism-Collectivism did not moderate the relation between perceived emotional
intelligence and depression. The dimension of Masculinity-Femininity played moderating
role instead, as the relationship between higher Attention scores and higher BDI scores
on one hand and higher Clarity scores and lower BDI scores on the other was more
intense in the feminine cultures of Chile and Spain. The authors surmise that the results
could be due to the greater emotional intensity associated with the feminine cultures.

Indigenous theories ofemotion. Studies like the one mentioned above encourage
researchers to examine other causes and attributions for the underlying differences in
emotional processing across cultures. As mentioned before, emotion theorists have called
for cultural/symbolic/meaning-centered approach to the study of emotions (Shweder &
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Haidt, 2000). The idea behind doing this is that the emotional experience is construed
differently across cultures (Mesquita, 2001). In fact, India is one of those countries which
can claim to have its own ancient, indigenous theory of emotions (Menon, 2000). This
theory was laid out in one of the chapters of the Natyashastra, a special text composed by
Bharat in approximately the third century A.D. and devoted to a context of recreation and
enjoyment through dramatics and poetry (Jain, 1994; Singh, 1999).
The concept that is being referred to is known as rasa, which can be roughly
translated as meta-emotion (Jain, 1994). Rasa refers to a transcendent state of aesthetic
experience, grounded in the day-to day acquisition ofthe ability to read others' moods
through a long practice of inferring emotions from verbal and non-verbal clues and
situational contexts (Singh, 1999). It naturally follows that rasa can be enjoyed through

art forms like poetry, dance or drama which utilize situational cues and expressions of
emotion.
The Natyashastra mentions eight rasas (meta-emotions), each of which is
produced by the joint interplay of related emotions (sthayibhava), related persons who
are the objects of emotion (alambanbhava), the presence of contextual objects

(vyabhicharibhava) and the expression of emotions (anubhava). For example, a
performance that incorporates a beloved person, objects like garlands or flowers that
signify that the characters are in love, and the use of gestures and expressions like shy
glances, together bring the emotion of love into being. All this when presented on the
stage, either through dance or drama, produces the rasa of sringar (eroticism) in the
audience (Jain, 1994).
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The Natyashastra basically tells us that the rasa are more like the union of three
script-like components, namely the determinant or eliciting conditions (e.g., forced
separation from a loved one or finding oneself powerless in a dangerous situation),

consequences which could be somatic (e.g., sweating, fainting, weeping, etc.), action
tendencies (e.g., abusing the body) and expressive modes (bodily movement, tone of
voice or facial expressions), and 'accompanying mental states' (e.g., weariness, panic,
shame etc., Shweder and Haidt, 2000). Ancient as this indigenous theory of emotions is,
it clearly demonstrates that as opposed to irrational passions overpowering an individual,
emotions arise from the intentional appraisal of objects in a given situation (Jain, 1994).
Thus, in Hindu India, emotions are not considered to reside only in the inner recesses of
the self (Menon, 2000); the emotional experience appears to be construed more on the
basis of relational events rather than mere feelings.
To sum it all, cultural salience is a theme that appears constantly in research and
literature on EI in the Indian scenario (Thingujam, 2004). It is clear that although
researchers in India recognize and accept the construct of Emotional Intelligence
(Thingujam), many of them have expressed the need for a more culturally-fair method of
assessing and substantiating the construct, as the Indian society with its collectivistic
values and inherent socialization according to an ancient theory of emotions may not be
exactly comparable to the more 'self based West. In spite of fairly obvious differences in
how the Indian and Western world views and values emotional processing, it is
fascinating how the basic tenet of rasa theory about the appreciation of emotions in daily
life, through individuals, objects and art forms finds validation and resonance in Mayer
and Salovey's current model of emotional intelligence, wherein they imply that an
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emotionally mature individual is able to perceive and evaluate emotion wherever it is
expressed, be it in themselves, other individuals, or in artwork (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).
Although Indian researchers have pointed out the fact that internalization of traditional
philosophical thoughts by lay persons appear to guide their emotional experiences (Jain,
1994), it is also clear that these indigenous Indian philosophies are not unique in their
entirety but also share a commonality with modem-day Western concepts of emotional
intelligence.
Secondly, as Patterson (1996, p. 230), pointed out, " ... we are rapidly becoming
one world, with rapid communication and increasing interrelations among persons from
varying cultures, leading to increasing homogeneity and a worldview representing the
common humanity that binds all humans together as species." It holds equally true for the
contemporary Indian society, which is a society in transition, with noticeably changing
trends in social institutions like marriage and family roles (Larson, Verma, & Dworkin,
2001; Seth & Vohra, 1994) and in emerging individualistic values like preference for
hedonism over duty to others (Seth & Vohra . 1994; Thingujam, 2004).
In such a scenario, it would be interesting to look into the emotional lives of my
countrymen, and compare them with those of the Western society. Unfortunately, there
are very few studies that compare and contrast emotional processing competencies
between Indian and other Western cultures. Shweder and Haidt (2000) assert that for the
sake of comparison and translation, any "emotion' is decomposable into its narrative slots
namely, somatic experiences (e.g., muscle tension, headaches), affective experiences
(e.g., emptiness, pleasantness), antecedent conditions (e.g., infertility, job loss), self
appraisal (e.g., irreplaceable loss, loss of fame), social appraisal (e.g., socially accepted or

Emotional Intelligence 46
deviant), self-management (e.g., attack, withdrawal etc) and expressions ( e.g., voice,
posture and facial expressions). Hence, to know if people are alike or different in terms of
their emotional functioning, it is necessary for researchers on emotion to decompose
emotional scripts into their constituent elements and compare them to see where the
similarities and differences lie (Menon, 2000).
Cross-cultural Comparisons in Emotional Processing
In the following section, I will describe cross-cultural research in emotional
processing under two broad heads: on an individual's ability to perceive emotional
information, to relate it to other sensations (such as color and taste), and to use it to
facilitate thought and on the ability to understand emotional information and use it
strategically for planning and self-management.
Cross-cultural comparisons in the perception, appraisal and expression of
emotion. The ability to perceive emotion has been widely studied in contemporary
research on culture and emotion. Much of this research has focused on basic emotion
theories which propose a limited and universal set of human emotions, which in turn are
connected to specific facial expressions and particular patterns of physiology (Mesquita,
2001).
A well-known line of research in this area is the work on recognition of facial
expressions of emotion across cultures. The model used in these studies usually requires
respondents to associate a picture of a face showing a given expression with an emotion
word from a list. An instance of this form of study is the one carried out by Haidt and
Keltner (1999), in which they showed people in India and the U.S. 14 photographs of
facial expressions, and simply asked them, "What has happened to make the person feel
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this way?" The photos showed facial displays of anger, fear, happiness, sadness, disgust,
surprise, contempt, amusement, embarrassment, shame, sympathy, and other exploratory
emotions. Additionally, participants usually provided affect words when discussing the
photos, of which the authors performed a free-response analysis. Results indicated that
both samples showed good recognition of the basic emotions like anger, disgust,
happiness, surprise, embarrassment, sadness, and fear, while there were some differences
in others like shame and embarrassment. The U.S. sample consisting of undergraduate
students at the University of Wisconsin-Madison performed better at distinguishing
between shame and embarrassment as compared to the Indian sample, consisting of men
and women, aged between 19-39 years, in a town in Orissa, India. The authors believe
that this difference might be attributed to the Indian use of the common word lajya to
refer to both emotions.
Another interesting difference that was found was in the description of the
situational antecedents of the different emotions. The anger expression, for example,
elicited extremely high recognition rates in both cultures, while the situational analyses
confirmed that the anger expression was usually the result of conflict, quarreling, or
fighting, often between friends and family members. The difference was that most
Wisconsin participants cited an offence or violation of the selfs rights committed by
another person as the cause of the anger (e.g., being stood up by a friend, getting cut off

in traffic, getting woken up at night, getting pinched). In the Indian sample, only four
participants described an offense against the self, while most common causes of raga or
anger were unpleasant social situations like conflicts, quarrelling or fighting between
friends and family members.
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According to the authors, anger in the U.S. sample thus seemed to evolve out of
offences against the self, out of self-defensiveness, while in the Indian sample, anger was
less individualistic and more about the status and health of ongoing relationships.
Similarly, the happiness expression in U.S. elicited mainly stories about individuals who
achieved their goals or achieved something they desired (e.g., an A on a test, ajob, a
raise, a date). These situation-types were also found in the Indian sample; however they
were outnumbered by situations describing reunions between friends and family. Thus,
the happiness expression in the Indian context appeared to have less to do with personal
fortune, and was more connected to the pleasure of social relationships. This increased
focus on social relationships rather than on the ups and downs of their personal lives
might be due to the collectivist culture in the Indian context, wherein emotions are felt
more intensely if the appraisals reflected that the situation was relevant to respectability,
status, or in group respectability (Mesquita, 2001).
While most researchers have concentrated on using the set of basic emotions as
outlined by Ekman (1972, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1984) in their studies in recognition of
facial expressions, a study was conducted to compare American and Indian recognition of
the different emotional portrayals mentioned in an ancient Indian text, the Natyashastra,
through the use of dynamic expressions using both face and body movements (Hejmadi,
Davidson, & Rozin, 2000). No overall differences were noted between American and
Indian students in the recognition of emotion on items requiring fixed responses from a
list of given emotion words. However, on items with a free-response format, Indians were
more accurate as compared to their American counterparts in recognizing lajya (Indian
emotion akin to shame/embarrassment/shyness), heroism and peace, which might be
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indicative of the greater salience of these indigenous categories or their lexical referents
for the Indian culture. Thus, while there can be no arguing about the fact that there exists
a certain degree of universality in the recognition and perception of emotions, one cannot
deny the fact that cultural salience and context plays an important contributory role in the
differences that exist in this area.
Another important component of the emotional process deals with socially
appropriate ways to express emotion (Menon, 2000). Also referred to as 'display rules'
by researchers, "these are learned rules that dictate the management of emotional
expressions based on social circumstances" (Matsumoto, Takeuchi, Andayani,
Kouznetsova, & Krupp, 1998, p. 148). In a study (Matsumoto, 1993) directed at
examining the differences in affect intensity, display-rule attitudes, self-reported
emotional expression and emotional labeling between different ethnic groups in an
American population, participants from four ethnic American groups (Caucasian, Asian,
Black and Hispanic) were shown photos of faces showing the seven universal emotions.
Participants were then asked to rate the appropriateness of the emotional situation in
different social situations (e.g. alone, in public, with close friends etc.), and also to rate
how frequently they themselves displayed these emotions. The author found that Blacks
perceived greater intensity when judging emotions and reported greater frequency of
anger expressions. Conversely, Asians were found to have consistently lower intensity
judgment and display rules appropriateness ratings. In Matsumoto's opinion, the
collective cultural norms that characterize the Asian groups lay emphasis on suppressing
one's emotional reactions so as not to offend others in the group, thereby avoiding
confrontation. These cultural nonns might be the basis for the members learning to
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attribute less intensity to the emotions of others and to discourage overt expression of
emotions, thus contributing to the observed differences in intensity ratings between them
and the Caucasian, Hispanic and Black groups. What is interesting about this study is that
though its aim was to examine cross-cultural differences in basic emotion display or
expression of emotion, what probably contributed to the observed differences were
actually differences in how emotions were regulated. Studies such as these lead me to
question the hierarchical model of EI as proposed by Mayer-Salovey-Caruso, wherein
expression of emotions paradoxically is placed on the lower-most branch.
Another broad area of research that addresses one of the components of
experiential EI is that of appraisal. Appraisal is basically a series of evaluations of a
situation/stimulus on a number of dimensions, such as novelty, pleasantness etc. The
assumption underlying appraisal research is that the emotional experience is contingent
on appraisal (Mesquita, 2001). This same understanding resonates to a certain degree in
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso's model ofEI where the components of higher branches like
understanding and regulating emotions are contingent on the components of lower
branches, including appraisal.
It then follows from the above assumption that initial appraisal predicts

subsequent emotional experience, leading one to expect that cultural differences in
appraisal would account for the differences in subsequent emotional experiences as well
(Mesquita, 2001). This hypothesis led to cross-cultural studies like the one conducted by
Roseman, Dhawan, Rettek, Naidu, and Thapa (1995) between Indian and American
students to examine the appraisals that elicit particular emotions. In this study, both
groups were shown cross-culturally validated photographs of faces showing sadness, fear
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or anger and asked to remember a time that they felt similarly. After being asked to
describe the experience, they answered questions related to their appraisals of the
situation and emotional responses. Evidence showed that an appraisal of an event as
being caused by circumstances led to emotions of sadness and fear, while appraisals that
other people caused negative events triggered anger, rather than sadness or fear in both
groups of students.
In this study, similar appraisals led to similar emotions irrespective of culture.
However, Indians were found to feel less intensity of sadness or fear than Americans in
similar situations, as they appraised sadness, anger and fear- causing events as more
motive-consistent or less discrepant from what they wanted (motivational state was
judged by answers to items like "Did you want to maximize some benefit in this
situation?" and "Was this event inconsistent with your desires?"). It appears that the
tendency of the Indian participants to appraise events as more motive-consistent (less
discrepant from what they wanted) accounted for their lower sadness and their lower
anger. The basis for this emotional reaction can be attributed to the concept of sarna
mentioned in the Natyashastra. Sarna (loosely translated as serenity/calmness) is a
significant emotion in the Hindu culture that emphasizes the importance of transcendence
and non-attachment (Haidt, 2003). On the contrary, American culture places great
emphasis on outcomes. It is possible that how the participants in the study experienced
emotions was influenced by different culturally-rooted philosophical orientations to
actions and their outcomes (Roseman et aI., 1995).
In summary, a review of relevant cross-cultural literature reveals that there is
considerable pan-cultural consistency in how individuals perceive emotions in facial
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expressions, except in cases where the emotion shown had more significance with respect
to a particular culture. Similarities also exist in how individuals across different cultures
appraise emotionally-laden situations. However, differences were evident in the
respondents' emotional responses (display rules) to events across cultures and these often
times reflect cultural differences in how these emotions are regulated.
Cross-cultural comparisons in understanding, regulating and managing
emotions. Although research in the universality of emotions and appraisals may form a

significant part of the body of cross-cultural research, other researchers are of the opinion
that appraisals and expression form only a part of our total emotional repertoire
(Mesquita, 2001; Shweder & Haidt, 2000), and thus an examination of the interaction
between culture and emotion perception, appraisal and expression will be inadequate.
The influences of culture go much beyond providing a lexicon for emotional experience
or regulating display rules and socially acceptable or deviant patterns of emotional
experience. Culture makes some feelings salient to our social selves (Kitmayer, 2001),
and this role of culture in how we understand and regulate our emotions begins right from
childhood, through the process of socialization. This usually occurs during the process of
child-rearing, as cultural values which determine a community's beliefs and standards of
behavior permeate caregiver behavior (Cole, Tamang, & Shreshtha, 2006).
An instance of how culture and socialization influence the regulation of emotions

can be found in the research of Cole et al. (2006). These authors refer to their study of
two rural Nepali communities, the Tamangs and Brahmins, and give examples of how
schoolchildren from the two communities react differently in the identical situations. For
instance, in a situation where an adult spills a drink on homework which consequently
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has to be redone, Brahmin children say that they are angry, but refuse to convey their
anger to the adult who spilled the drink. On the contrary, Tamang children said they
would feel 'ashamed' and not angry, as it was their fault that they had placed the drink
there. The authors suggest that the differences in emotional reactions can be attributed to
the differences in their socialization. Tamangs are followers of Buddhism, and their
culture is dominated by concerns of modesty, humility and respect. On the other hand,
Brahmins are high-caste Hindus who are considered the privileged class of society, and
they often are proud of their learned status. Thus, while a Tamang child is socialized to
feel shame instead of anger which is inconsistent with their cultural priorities, a Brahmin
child's caregivers might socialize him such that anger is justified but its expression is not,
as it conveys disrespect for elders.
As stated before, second-order emotional knowledge is open to a wide range of
cultural influences. In addition to caregivers, peers also form an important influence on
how emotions are to be regulated. An instance of this can be found in the study
conducted by Raval, Martini, & Raval (2007) in a sample of Gujarati children in India.
The methodology involved reading the children separate vignettes conveying emotions of
sadness, anger and physical pain. The children were then asked about how they would
respond in similar situations, and how and why they would express/conceal their
emotions in front of parents and peers. Results showed that these children overall
perceived others to be less accepting of their feelings of anger and sadness, and hence
would express physical pain more often than the other two. Even when they decided to
express anger or sadness, they were more likely to do so using indirect means of
expression like sitting quietly in a comer or facial expressions, rather than verbally
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conveying it, as in case of physical pain. Additionally, these children reported controlling
their feelings in front of their parents for fear of being reprimanded or scolded, while they
also reported doing so in front of their peers for fear of being ridiculed. This study shows
how peers also serve a regulatory function in deciding the appropriateness of emotional
behavior in different cultures. Again, the findings of this study reflect the collectivist
nature of the Indian culture wherein the self is seen as part of the group, leading to
heightened concerns about self-presentation and loss of face (Singh-Manoux &
Finkenauer, 2001).
Culture not only sets limits for expression of emotions, it also provides lay
theories and strategies for managing strong emotions (Kirmayer, 2001). Multiple
instances of this fact can be found in the work of researchers who have studied the
phenomenon of somatization in depression cross-culturally (Bhui, Bhugra, Goldberg,
Sauer, & Tylee, 2004; Conrad & Pacquio, 2005; Derasari & Shah, 1988). These studies
reveal that Indian samples are more likely to report physical symptoms like physical
aches and pains instead of psychological ones when facing emotional distress, as doing so
is more in accordance with their cultural beliefs and behavioral standards.
Socio-cultural norms influence the management of emotions in myriad other
ways. One of those strategies is social sharing, or recounting and sharing of emotional
experience by an individual with his socio-cultural environment. A study examined the
phenomenon of social sharing ofthree emotions, namely fear, sadness and shame across
adolescent samples from the Indian, immigrant Indian and English communities (Singh
Manoux & Finkenauer, 2001). The exploratory study required the adolescents to fill out a
questionnaire about the preceding situation for the three felt emotions, details of sharing

Emotional Intelligence 55
about the emotional experience, reactions of the sharing partner and the perceived benefit
of sharing. Results indicated that as compared to the English, a greater proportion of both
Indian and immigrant Indian participants shared more with their families, reported
receiving more help/advice from their sharing partners and perceived sharing to be more
beneficial in general. In contrast, the English group reported superficial sharing of only
factual details, with detached responses from the sharing partner. The authors attributed
this difference to the collectivistic, interdependent nature of the Indian groups, as
compared to the English individualistic values of self-sufficiency and independence.
Hence, culture influences the management and regulation of emotions in various ways. It
provides acceptable modes of expression, determines which emotions should be revealed
and which should be concealed, and even provides strategies for managing the intensity
of emotions.
It clearly emerges at this point that culture plays a significant role in how

emotions are experienced, regulated and managed. The logical question that follows is if
the underlying competencies show variation with culture, then is emotional intelligence
itself a culture-bound phenomenon? Salovey asks this question himself (2005). He agrees
that certain display rules for emotional expression might be culture-specific, but wonders
if the underlying skills are really different. "We think, in general, that they are not, but we
really do not know for sure" (Salovey, p.vi). On the contrary, Indian researchers have
accepted the validity of emotional intelligence as a construct, but believe a more
culturally-fair method of assessing and substantiating the construct is needed to do justice
to its collectivistic 'self.
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In essence, a review of literature on cross-cultural psychology of emotions will
reveal cross-cultural similarities as well as differences in each phase of the emotion
process (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). Considerable universality exists with regards to
perception of emotions as in facial expressions, while the major sources of differences lie

in the processes of regulation of emotion (e.g. as captured through display rules,
somatization, social sharing ,etc.) and in certain appraisal propensities. Also, cross
cultural similarity or difference in one respect does not necessarily imply similarity or
difference in other respects (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). It might be pertinent at this point
to quote Alan Roland, who has written widely about his experiences drawn from doing
clinical psychoanalytic work in the U.S., India and JapanI realized ... the very thrust of searching for universals of development,
structuralization, and functioning results from the Western cognitive mode of
universalistic, abstract thinking where the universal and the unique are elaborated,
as contrasted to the Indian mode of abstraction where one is constantly thinking in
terms of contexts (Roland, 1984, p. 572).

Clinical Implications o/Cultural Variations in Emotional Intelligence Competencies
In this section, I will consider the implications of these cultural variations in EI
,

competencies for the enhancement of psychological health and well-being in American

\
and Indian cultures.
Unfortunately, research on application of emotional intelligence in India has
mostly been limited to the demonstrating the effectiveness ofEI in organizations (Khanna

& Vohra, 2003: Singh & Woods, 2008), primarily using EI measures developed in the
West. When it comes to examining how emotional intelligence might possibly impact
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psychological health particularly in India, research is sparse. One study that was
conducted in New Delhi, India, examined the relation between emotional intelligence and
subjective well-being in a group of executives, and concluded that subjects with higher
emotional intelligence scored significantly high on positive affect and low on negative
affect, with higher scores for life satisfaction as well (Kulshreshtha & Sen, 2006).
Implications for Establishing and Diagnosing Psychopathology
With a dearth of research hindering any effort to support or make a claim about
the connections between emotional intelligence and psychopathology in a cross- cultural
setting, it would be appropriate to adopt a conceptual approach to the issue. For instance,
let us consider depression. In our previous section, we have already reviewed some of the
research that has demonstrated how individuals with deficits in the ability to regulate
their own emotions are more likely to score higher on measures for depression. In fact,
some of the stalwarts in the field of emotional intelligence believe that an emotionally
intelligent individual is more likely to cope successfully with stressors through utilization
of skills like lesser engagement in rumination, prompt emotional disclosure and increased
use of social support (Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer, 1999). On the other hand,
our review of literature suggests that in Hindu India, emotions are not considered to
reside only in the inner recesses of the self (Menon, 2000). That might lead us to
speculate that Indians, like those from other collectivistic cultures ,are less likely to spend
time focusing intensely on their inner experiences of emotion (Fernandez-Berrocal,
Salovey, et aI., 2005). Additionally, Indian participants in studies on social sharing have
been shown to share more and actively with their families, reported receiving more
help/advice from their sharing partners and perceived sharing to be more beneficial in
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general (Singh-Manoux & Finkenauer, 2001). Given this information, would it make
sense to hypothesize that Indians, who in general appear to utilize most of the skills
necessary for successful coping, are less likely to report negative affect as compared to
their Western counterparts? Hardly, for statistics reveal otherwise. Health facility-based
studies have been undertaken in different settings in India which include primary health
centers, tertiary teaching hospitals, private psychiatric clinics or psychiatric outpatient
departments. The proportion of cases reporting some kind of depressive symptoms range
from 20% to 43% of all cases seen (Gururaj, Girish, & Isaac, 2005).
What is interesting though when we do a cross-cultural comparison is that studies
on depression have revealed that there is a higher frequency of somatic symptoms in the
Indian population as compared to the American population (Derasari & Shah, 1988). This
has often been attributed to the stigma and sense of shame associated with mental illness
in the Indian culture (Chowdhury et aI., 2000). Somatization of symptoms is accepted by
many counselors as expressions of psychological distress (Draguns, 1997). Why Indians
show a predilection to express their psychological distress through somatic symptoms
might be better understood from a psychodynamic line of reasoning as put forward by
Roland (1984). He believes that the modes of cognition and ego functioning ofthe
individualized self in India is highly contextual and oriented towards symbolicity and
metaphorical expression, which might explain why physical symptoms like headaches
come to the fore. On the other hand, the mode of cognition and ego-functioning in the
U.S.A. is strongly oriented towards rationalism and self-reflection, which might explain
the connection between increased rumination and depression as seen in some studies on
U.S. subjects (Fernandez-Berrocal, Salovey, et al., 2005).
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It is a possibility then that psychopathology like depression should not be viewed

as a mere deficit in emotional competencies, but rather as a maladaptive usage of the
emotional competencies in a cultural context. As mentioned before, the American self
seeks to self-reflect when it comes to emotions. While this might prove to be an
emotionally competent tool for most, some of them might engage in excessive self
focused attention and get caught up in a ruminative style of coping. This then becomes
maladaptive and can become counterproductive. In the Indian context, there is an
environment of emotional connectedness and interdependence in hierarchical
relationships, be it family or workplace. Often ambivalent or negative emotions are
suppressed or denied, especially if they might disturb the harmony of the relationships
(Roland, 1984). Obviously these norms for regulating emotions have been successfully
utilized by most people in this cultural milieu. However, this strong emotional
interconnectedness also opens up more avenues for hurt and anger, when the expectations
for reciprocal understanding of emotions, attitudes and needs are not met. If the hurt and
anger build up and cannot be handled by culturally prescribed strategies for emotion
regulation like containment or suppression, psychopathology might result.
Implications for Therapy
An analytical study of the differences and similarities between the American and
Indian population in their use of emotional competencies in their daily lives is important
for several reasons. The number ofIndians in the United States has increased
considerably over the last few years, and they now constitute a growing segment of
American society, especially in urban areas (source:

www.migrationinformation.org).
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In such a scenario of steadily-increasing migration, the first concern is one of
intercultural adjustment. Research has demonstrated that high emotion regulation is the
most important predictor of positive inter-cultural adjustment (Matsumoto, Le Roux et
aI., 2003). As the spectrum of presenting symptoms usually decides the diagnoses and
ultimately the entire course of therapy, a better knowledge about how various cultural
groups might broadly differ in their emotional competencies might prove to be of
assistance to those clinicians who largely deal with a clinically diverse population.
Then again, not only does emotional intelligence influence stress levels and
psychological well-being, it also influences an individual's willingness to seek help from
professional and non-professional sources (Ciarrochi & Deane, 200 I). Knowing how
differences in emotional competencies may affect how different cultural groups view
seeking help for psychological problems, early detection and preventive programs can be
built with that in focus.
Finally, an analysis of how individuals differ in emotional intelligence can
provide clues to effective counseling. For instance, in Hindu India, emotions are not
thought to reside in the innermost recesses of the self; hence the belief that introspection
will not help one to recognize one's own emotions nor know oneself better (Menon,
2000). In contrast, the essential component of the American selfrevolves around working
out how one feels (Mesquita & Karasawa, 2004). One approach might be to utilize these
cultural frameworks and to tailor therapy accordingly. Thus, American clients might
benefit from therapies like Emotionally Focused Therapy (EFT) that focus on emotions,
their accurate perception and appraisal, understanding the emotional experience and
transforming the emotions. Similarly, Indian clients might be encouraged to follow
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distinct ways of coping that are more culturally relevant, such as meditation and yoga
(Laungani, 1996). These practices are likely to cater to the spiritualism inherent in the
Indian belief system, which believes that the ultimate purpose of human existence is to
transcend one's physical existence and attain a heightened state of emotional awareness
(Laungani, 2001)
Another approach that might be considered in therapy is to broaden one's
emotional competencies by learning to utilize some of the skills, which might not have
been part of their inherent socio-culturallearning, but have been shown to be useful to
others. Examples of this approach might be the increased use of techniques like
mindfulness training in the Western world. Mindfulness has its roots in Buddhist -Zen
philosophy, and essentially describes an alert mode of perceiving all sensations,
cognitions and affect with a warm, friendly, accepting and non-judgmental attitude
(Walach, Buchheld, Buttenmuller, Kleinknecht, & Schmidt, 2006). There are several
definitions for the concept (Bishop et aI., 2004; Kabat-Zinn, 2003), and several measures
as well (Baer, 2007). Recent research has revealed that three elements of mindfulness
have been shown to be especially helpful in improving psychological functioning;

observing (the tendency to attend to internal and external experiences, such as sensations,
emotions, sounds, sights and smells), non-judging a/inner experience (taking a non
evaluative stance towards thoughts and feelings) and a non-reactivity to inner experience
(the tendency to allow thoughts and feelings to come and go without getting caught up in
them or carried away by them)(Baer, 2007). During mindfulness practice, individuals are
asked to be aware of when their thoughts drift to the past or the future and to gently
redirect their attention to the present moment experience (such as their breathing or
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bodily sensations) (Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, Greeson, & Laurenceau, 2007). Mindfulness
practitioners learn to allow thoughts and feelings to come and go as they are, without
necessarily responding to them or getting carried away by them (Baer, 2007). Thus,
mindfulness training can help individuals suffering from psychopathology like
depression, by encouraging them to observe their thoughts dispassionately, without
getting absorbed in them or ruminating about them, and instead directing attention to
present-moment experiences.
On the other hand, therapists who are in tune with recent trends of psychotherapy
in India have reported a growing interest in that country for therapy forms like
Emotionally-Focused Therapy (EFT) (Rastogi, Natarajan, & Thomas, 2005). In this form
of therapy, the key concept is to coach people in resolving conflicts in their intimate
relationships by helping them realize and reveal their softer, core emotions like sadness,
fear or shame underlying their secondary or defensive emotions like withdrawal,
submission or anger (Goldman & Greenberg, 2006). This increasing focus on emotions
and the true emotional experience becomes interesting in the light of what Roland (1984)
has to say about the intense emotional connectedness of the family hierarchical
relationships in India where there is "strong expectations for reciprocity and for the
others to be highly empathically sensitive to one's feelings, moods, and needs without
having to express them explicitly" (p. 579). He goes on to say that in order to maintain
the relationships, any disruptive feelings are often" ... contained, inhibited or defended
against through a variety of unconscious defense mechanisms..."(p. 580). It might be so
that this growing demand for forms of therapy that coach the importance of accurate
perception, understanding, expression and transformation of emotions reflects a growing
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understanding that some of the culturally prescribed forms of regulating the self are
contributing to conflicts in interpersonal relationships.

Conclusion
Emotions have fascinated humans since time immemorial, and the relationship
between emotion and cognition has been widely researched. The concept of emotional
intelligence or EI provides an exciting medium to look at the interrelatedness of emotion
and cognition. Currently, there are multiple theories about how EI should be
operationalized, and several instruments to measure it. While most of the research has
been concentrated in the Western world, there has been some research conducted in other
countries like India. However, a review ofliterature on cross-cultural studies ofEI and
emotional competencies reveals that culture definitely influences the adaptive usage of
emotions by individuals in their daily lives. While considerable universality exists with
regards to perception of emotions in facial expressions, major sources of differences lie in
the processes of regulation of emotion (e.g. as captured through display rules,
somatization, social sharing, etc.).
The applicability of EI has been more widely researched in the fields of
organizational and school psychology than in others. However, there is also considerable
interest in how emotional intelligence can influence mental health. High levels of
emotional intelligence have been related to both physical and psychological well-being.
On the other hand, evidence has been found that lower levels of emotional intelligence
are related to depression, anxiety, personality disorders like borderline personality
disorder, ineffective coping under stress, and poorer adjustment. A clear understanding of
how the different emotional competencies included under the broader construct of EI
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influence various psychopathological disorders will be helpful in planning specific
treatment interventions. In this context, cross-cultural differences in emotional
competencies also become relevant. While culture often plays an extremely influential
role in the manifestation of psychopathology, it can facilitate the determination of
appropriate interventions as well.
Existing literature supports the notion that emotions are construed differently
across cultures. While the Indian mode of cognition and action is highly contextualized,
the more individualized West is focused on the self. When it comes to emotions, these
subtle but basic differences might lead to cultural variations in regulation of emotions, in
the stages of emotional processing that go beyond mere feeling of an emotion, to where
an individual consciously reflects on hislher emotional responses (referred to as meta
evaluation) and effectively regulates them (meta-regulation)(Mayer & Salovey, 1997).
Therapy techniques like mindfulness training and emotion-focused therapy thus become
extremely useful. They assist individuals of both cultures to pay attention to their mood,
identitY how typical, clear, acceptable or influential their mood is and to regulate it, either
by simply experiencing the mood as it is or by transforming it.
As times change, the concept of the self expands and evolves, be it in India or
America. This change is being brought about by the incorporation of paradigms from
other cultures and by changes that are occurring in their own cultural principles (Roland,
1984). There is a growing awareness that both Eastern and Western psychotherapies can
benefit from the integration of paradigms, and what might appear 'culturally incongruent'
at times, might even bring 'relief (Van Hoecke, 2006). Thus, the concept of emotional
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intelligence and its cultural variations deepen our understanding of psychopathology and
treatment, making them more relevant and meaningful to the individual in question.
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